"It is well settled that in this state a marriage may be only annulled for fraud if the fraud relates to a matter which the state deems vital to the marriage relationship. ( Maslow v. Maslow, 117 Cal.App.2d 237 [255 P.2d 65]; Bruce v. Bruce, 71 Cal.App.2d 641 [163 P.2d 95]; Bragg v. Bragg, 219 Cal. 715, 720 [28 P.2d 1046]; Marshall v. Marshall, 212 Cal. 736, 738-739 [300 P. 816, 75 A.L.R. 661]; Mayer v. Mayer, 207 Cal. 685, 695 [279 P. 783]; Foy v. Foy, 57 Cal.App.2d 334 [134 P.2d 29].) (2) The fact represented or suppressed, as the case may be, is deemed material if it relates to a matter of substance and directly affects the purpose of the party deceived in entering the contract. (3) The deceived party may be relieved from his contract upon proof that he would not have entered into it if he had known the facts and performance of it would give him substantially less than he bargained for. ( Schaub v. Schaub, 71 Cal.App.2d 467, 475 [162 P.2d 966].)"

"The concealment of 'incontinence, temper, idleness, extravagance, coldness or fortune inadequate to representations' cannot be the basis for an annulment. (Marshall v. Marshall (1931) 212 Cal. 736, 740 [300 P. 816, 75 A.L.R. 661], italics omitted.) If a shoe salesman's false representation that he owned his own shoe store fell short of “fraud sufficient to annul a marriage” in Mayer v. Mayer (1929) 207 Cal. 685, 694-695 [P. 783], or a future husband's statement that he was a 'man of means' (when he was really “impecunious”) was not enough in Marshall v. Marshall, supra, 212 Cal. at pages 737-738, how much less so are the grounds here, where the husband turned out to be, in the eyes of his wife, a lazy, unshaven disappointment with a drinking problem. In California, fraud must go to the very essence of the marital relation before it is sufficient for an annulment. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the annulment."

In the present case, Meagher does not contend that there is any evidence that Maleki lied to her about his marital history, or that he concealed an intention not to have sexual relations with her, not to live with her after the marriage, or not to **669 discontinue an intimate relationship with a third party. On the contrary, the parties began living together even before their marriage and continued to do so for well over two years thereafter, and Meagher cites to no evidence in the record that she ever expressed any dissatisfaction with the intimate aspects of their relationship. Instead, she argues that the financial fraud at issue in this case is “at least as contrary to the essence of marriage” as the types of fraud that have been held sufficient to justify annulment. She cites no authority, however, either in California or elsewhere, for the proposition that annulment can be granted based on fraud or misrepresentation of a purely financial nature. As already noted, the cases are entirely to the contrary. Accordingly, we agree with Maleki that the fraud established in this case, as a matter of law, was not of the type that constitutes an adequate basis for granting an annulment.

"'The true test in actions to annul a marriage on account of insanity at the time of the marriage,' says Nelson (Divorce and Separation, sec. 658) is whether the party was capable of understanding the obligations assumed by marriage. The capacity requisite to a valid marriage is defined, in Durham v. Durham, 10 Probate Division 80, as 'a capacity to understand the nature of the contract, and the duties and responsibilities which it creates.' (See, also, Kern v. Kern, 51 N. J. Eq. 574, [26 Atl. 837]; Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, [20 Am. St. Rep, 559, 9 L. R. A. 505, 46 N. W. 323]; St. George v. Biddeford, 76 Me. 593.)"